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EDUCATION
N.Y CONST. art Xl § 1:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of
a system offree common schools, wherein all the children of this
state may be educated.
COURT OF APPEALS
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York1
(decided June 15, 1995)
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the financing
systems for public schools implemented by the State of New
York, claiming that it violated the Education Article of the New
York State Constitution2 and the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Federal3 and New York State4 Constitutions. 5 The New York
1. 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. The Education Article provides: "The
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
5. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 312-13, 655 N.E.2d at 663,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 567. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the state's
financing scheme violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its
implementing regulations. Id. at 313, 655 N.E.2d at 664, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
568. The court held that the plaintiffs' Title VI claim could not succeed since
their complaint failed to show intentional discrimination by the state financing
system, which is required for all Title VI claims. Id. at 321-22, 655 N.E.2d at
669, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)
and Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1228 (1983)). Nonetheless, the court determined that the plaintiffs had a
valid claim under Title VI's implementing regulations, more specifically 34
C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1995), which does not require a showing of intent to
discriminate. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 322, 655 N.E.2d at
669, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 573. It merely requires a showing that "a challenged
practice has a sufficiently adverse racial impact-in other words, whether it falls
1
et al.: Education
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Court of Appeals reinstated the plaintiffs' Education Article
claim, since the plaintiffs had "alleged facts which fit within a
cognizable legal theory" 6 that inadequate funding impeded a
student's opportunity to receive a "sound basic education." 7 In
analyzing the plaintiff's equal protection claim, the court applied
rational basis review to plaintiffs' equal protection claim and
found that the state's educational financing system was rationally
related to its legitimate interest in controlling education on a local
level. 8 Based on this finding, the court dismissed the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim. 9
The plaintiffs consisted of fourteen school districts within New
York City, individual public school students, and a not-for-profit
corporation composed of school boards, citizens, and parent
advocacy groups. 10 At the time this case was first decided by the
Appellate Division, First Department, the State of New York
distributed approximately nine billion dollars state-wide to public
school districts.11 The plaintiffs alleged that only 34% of those
funds went to New York City public schools, even though these
schools educated 37% of the student population of the state. 12
They asserted that the state's financing system perpetuated
unevenness that existed in educational opportunities available to
students in city and non-city school districts. 13
In addition, they maintained that city schools are often "beset
with high operating costs and unique drains on school funds,
suffering in blighted or antiquated facilities, with less qualified
significantly more harshly on a minority racial group than on the majority-and,
if so, whether the practice is nevertheless adequately justified." Id. at 323, 655
N.E.2d at 670, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (quoting Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D. Ala. 1991)).
6. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 667-68, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.
7. Id. at 316, 655 N.E.2d at 666, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
8. Id. at 320-21, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
9. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
10. Id. at 312, 655 N.E.2d at 663, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
11. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 205 A.D.2d
272, 275, 619 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (1st Dep't 1994), modified, 86 N.Y.2d 307,
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teachers and overall inadequate resources," whereas non-city
school districts, which have "ample local tax revenue, are able to
offer modem and well-maintained facilities, better credentialed
teachers, more favorable teacher-student ratios and a wider array
of educational resources." 14 Prompted by this disparity, the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment alleging, inter alia,
violations of the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and
New York State Constitutions. 15
The plaintiffs' first legal assertion alleged that the educational
funding system employed by the state violated the Education
Article because it failed to "provide [city students] ... an
opportunity to obtain a sound basic education as required by the
State Constitution."16 The Appellate Division, First Department
had granted defendants' motion to dismiss concerning this claim
because that court found the plaintiffs' allegations were similar to
those made in Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist.17
14. Id.
15. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 312-13, 655 N.E.2d at 663-
64, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68. The plaintiffs also alleged that the financing
scheme violated the Antidiscrimination Clause of the New York State
Constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 21
U.S.C. § 2000d (1988), and its implementing provisions. Id. at 313, 655
N.E.2d at 664, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 568. The supreme court had dismissed all
claims except for the Education Article claim, the Antidiscrimination Clause
claim, and the claim concerning the implementing provisions of the Civil
Rights Act. Id. at 313, 655 N.E.2d at 664, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 568. However,
the appellate division subsequently dismissed these three claims based on the
plaintiffs' failure to allege a cause of action. Id.
16. Id. at 314, 655 N.E.2d at 664, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
17. Id. at 315-16, 655 N.E.2d at 665, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 569. See
Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359,
453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982). In Levittown, the plaintiffs argued that the state's
educational funding system violated the Education Article because property-
rich areas were able to raise the funding necessary to supplement the funds
supplied by the state through tax revenues which allowed them to provide an
adequate education, while the property-poor districts could not. Id. at 35-36,
439 N.E.2d at 361-62, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646. The plaintiffs alleged that the
system "result[ed] in grossly disparate financial support (and thus grossly
disparate educational opportunities) in the school districts of the State." Id.
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The court of appeals held that the appellate division erred by
denying the plaintiffs' claim, since the Levittown decision
"manifestly left room for a conclusion that a system which failed
to provide for a sound basic education would violate the
Education Article." 18
The court of appeals stated that the Education Article requires
that the state provide "all children [with an] opportunity of a
sound basic education ... [which] should consist of the basic
literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable
children to eventually function productively as civic participants
capable of voting and serving on a jury." 19 In addition, the court
determined that the state is obligated to provide certain essentials,
such as "minimally adequate physical facilities," 20 "minimally
adequate instrumentalities of learning,"' 2 1  and "minimally
does not guarantee equality in educational services, but only required that those
services be adequate to provide a "sound basic education." Id. at 47-48, 439
N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (stating that merely "assuring minimal
acceptable facilities and services" was intended upon adoption of the Education
Article).
18. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 316, 655 N.E.2d at 665,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 569. The plaintiffs were not claiming that educational
services were not equal. Rather, they asserted that "minimally acceptable
educational services and facilities [were] not being provided." Id.
19. Id. at 316, 655 N.E.2d at 666, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (citation omitted).
The court reiterated that:
[t]he Legislature has made prescriptions (or in some instances provided
means by which prescriptions may be made) with reference to the
minimum number of days of school attendance, required courses,
textbooks, qualifications of teachers and of certain nonteaching
personnel, pupil transportation, and other matters. If what is made
available by this system (which is what is to be maintained and
supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the
constitutional mandate is satisfied.
Id. (quoting Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d
at 653).
20. Id. at 317, 655 N.E.2d at 666, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 570. ("Children are
entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide
enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn.").
21. Id. ("Children should have access to minimally adequate
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adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula." 22
The court established that it is up to the trier of fact to decide
whether the state had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to
provide a sound basic education to the children in this case.23
Moreover, the court of appeals expressed that the "plaintiffs
[would] have to establish a causal link between the present
funding system and any proven failure to provide a sound basic
education to New York City school children" to be successful in
this case. 24
The court concluded that since the plaintiffs' allegations were
supported by factually based circumstantial evidence such as
"inadequacies in physical facilities, curricula, numbers of
qualified teachers, availability of textbooks, library books, etc.,"
their claim based on the Education Article survived the
defendants' motion to dismiss.25 Accordingly, the court
reinstated the cause of action.26
22. Id. ("Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of
reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics,
science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach
those subject areas."). The court of appeals stated that the minimum statewide
educational standards conceived by the Board of Regents and the
Commissioner of Education "exceed notions of a minimally adequate or sound
basic education," and thus, failure to comply with any of the standards does
not on its own violate the Education Article. Id. Similarly, the court asserted
that standardized competency tests, although helpful, should be used prudently
in evaluating educational skills because test results depend upon many different
factors. Id.
23. Id. at 317-18, 655 N.E.2d at 666-67, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 570-71. In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Simons declared that the issue of what is required to
ensure that "a sound basic education" is available to all public school children
is a question for the other governmental branches, and is not properly within
the domain of the courts. Id. at 333, 655 N.E.2d at 676, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
He explained that the Education Article's history merely evidences a
constitutional duty upon the state to "createGl the structure for a State-wide
system of schools in which children are given the opportunity to acquire an
education and support[] it." Id. (Simons, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 318, 655 N.E.2d at 667, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
25. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 667, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 571. The court also
noted that considering the facts given by the plaintiffs, they would be entitled
to relief, and thus, the plaintiffs' pleading was sufficient to satisfy section
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The second cause of action alleged that the state's educational
funding system was unconstitutional pursuant to the Federal and
New York State Equal Protection Clauses. 27 Following the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez,2 8 the court used the rational basis
test to analyze each equal protection claim, based on the fact that
education is not recognized as a fundamental right under either
N.E.2d at 667, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 571. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
321 l(a)(7) (McKinney 1992). This section provides in pertinent part: "A party
may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted
against him on the ground that: ... (7). the pleading fails to state a cause of
action . . . ." Id. Judge Simons, in his dissent, criticized the majority's
analysis and, reiterating the interpretation in Levittown, explained that in order
to obtain judicial review concerning an objection to a state financing system
based on the Education Article, there must be a finding of "'gross and glaring
inadequacy' in State funding." Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 340,
655 N.E.2d at 680, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (quoting Levittown Union Free Sch.
Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643,
653 (1982)). He concluded that since schools in New York City receive one
third of the entire allowance appropriated to state public education, there is no
gross inadequacy in state financing, and therefore the majority erred by finding
a valid claim under the Education Article. Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 667-68, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.
27. Id. at 319, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs alleged that the state
financing scheme for Texas public schools, which was partially based on the
property wealth of a school district, violated their equal protection rights. Id.
at 6, 9-14. The Supreme Court found that "substantial interdistrict disparities
in school expenditures ... still exist" in San Antonio. Id. at 15. The Court
stated that strict scrutiny would only be applied if "the Texas system of
financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class
or impinges upon a fundamental right ... [and] [i]f not, the Texas scheme
must ... be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated state purpose." Id. at 17. In determining that wealth is
not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right, the Supreme Court
determined that rational basis was the appropriate standard of review to be
applied. Id. at 28-29, 37-39, 44. The Court held that "[t]he constitutional
standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest .... [and] [w]e
hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard." Id. at 55 (citing
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)).
[Vol 12840
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the Federal or New York State Constitutions. 29 As a result, the
court held that "any disparities in educational funding among
school districts in the State arising from the State's financing
scheme were rationally based upon and reasonably related to a
legitimate State interest, 'the preservation and promotion of local
control of education.'" 30
With respect to their equal protection claim, the plaintiffs,
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe,3 1
argued that the court should apply intermediate scrutiny because
the funding system of the state "deprives New York City school
29. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 319-20, 655 N.E.2d at 668,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 572. The New York Court of Appeals first adopted the
reasoning of Rodriguez in its decision in Levittown Union Free School District
v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 41, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364-65, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643,
649 (1982). The court of appeals determined that rational basis was the
appropriate standard of review under the Federal and New York State
Constitutions for an equal protection challenge brought against a state public
school funding scheme. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
Accordingly, the majority in Campaign for Fiscal Equity recognized that
rational basis review should be used in evaluating equal protection claims
pursuant to the Federal and New York State Constitutions. Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 320, 655 N.E.2d 661, 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565,
572. However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith quoted the following
United States Supreme Court decision to contradict the majority: "As
Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet definitively settled the
questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be
accorded heightened equal protection review." Id. at 350, 655 N.E.2d at 686,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 590 ((quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285) (1986)).
In addition, Judge Smith distinguished the present case from Rodriguez by
asserting that Rodriguez did not involve an allegation that the children were
receiving an inadequate education. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Judge Smith emphasized that when deciding Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
first inquired whether a suspect class was at issue, for if one was, strict
scrutiny would have been applied. Id. at 351, 655 N.E.2d at 686, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Smith, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 320, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572 (quoting
Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 27, 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651).
31. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (applying a heightened level of scrutiny in
reviewing an equal protection challenge to a Texas statute which intentionally
denied children of illegal aliens a free public school education, and
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children of a 'minimum adequate education." 32 Thus, the burden
should be shifted "to the State to show a substantial relationship
of its educational funding scheme to a substantial State
interest." 33 The court clarified that the Plyler holding does not
raise the level of scrutiny for all equal protection challenges to
state financing schemes. 34 Moreover, unlike the facts in Plyler,
the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege that the rights of certain
individuals or a distinct subclass were violated, but merely
claimed "violations of the 'state-wide minimum standard of
educational quality and quantity.' 35 Thus, the court held that the
state's funding scheme did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Federal Constitution. 36
The plaintiffs alternatively argued that the "State's educational
funding methodology has a disparate impact upon African-
American and other minority students," and therefore,
heightened scrutiny should be utilized by the court in evaluating
the equal protection claim under the New York State
Constitution. 37 The court of appeals, however, again refused to
apply heightened scrutiny. 38 This was based on the fact that "an
equal protection cause of action based upon a disproportionate
impact upon a suspect class requires establishment of intentional
32. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 320, 655 N.E.2d at 668,
631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
33. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith agreed with the plaintiffs in
that the facts warrant at least mid-level scrutiny. Id. at 349, 655 N.E.2d at
685, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 589. In that opinion, he stated that if it can be proven
that the subject class is not receiving a:
minimal basic education sufficient to prepare [students] for
contemporary society ... and it can further be shown that (1) the
property tax funding of schools and or (2) the State allocation of its
resources is discriminatory, plaintiffs may be entitled to a decision in
their favor... on Federal equal protection grounds.
Id. at 349-50, 655 N.E.2d at 686, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 320, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 321, 655 N.E.2d at 668, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
37. Id. at 321, 655 N.E.2d at 668-69, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73.
38. Id. at 321, 655 N.E.2d at 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
[Vol 12
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discrimination," and the plaintiffs did not even allege
discriminatory intent in this case. 39 In sum, the New York Court
of Appeals determined that the state funding scheme was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and thus,
did not violate either the Federal or New York State
Constitutions. 40
In conclusion, this case demonstrates that rational basis review
shall be used in evaluating equal protection challenges made
under the Federal and New York State Constitutions to school
financing schemes that create disparities in funding among school
39. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied on case law
handed down from the United States Supreme Court. See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (stating that
"official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a
racially disproportionate impact... [and] [p]roof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), aft'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir.
1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing
alone, it does not trigger the rule.., that racial classifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny") (citations omitted). In addition, the court
relied on its own precedent. See People v. New York City Transit Auth., 59
N.Y.2d 343, 350, 452 N.E.2d 316, 319, 465 N.Y.S.2d 502, 505 (1983)
(stating that in order to have a cause of action under the New York State
Constitution for a violation of equal protection based on a disproportionate
impact of a law that is facially neutral, a showing of "purposeful
discrimination is a necessary element"). In his dissenting opinion, joined by
Judge Cipatrick, Judge Smith deemed the disparity of educational opportunities
unjustified under the New York State Constitution and stated that
[ilt is this result-lesser educational opportunity which denies a sound,
basic education, based on wealth discrimination-that allegedly
transgresses the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution, and
would require [the State] to demonstrate at trial that the current school
funding scheme bears an important and substantial relationship to the
State's interest in preserving the current funding scheme and its
rationale, which interest cannot be achieved through a less intrusive
alternative.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 86 N.Y.2d at 358, 655 N.E.2d at 691, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 595 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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districts.41 The court recognized that a state has a legitimate
interest in controlling education within its borders. 42 However,
the court of appeals also determined that the plaintiffs had a
cognizable cause of action under the Education Article of the
New York State Constitution for the state's failure of the state to
provide a "sound basic education."' 43 Thus, because the United
States Constitution does not contain a provision similar to the
Education Article of the New York State Constitution assuring
"maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,
wherein all the children of [the] state may be educated," 44 the
New York State Constitution provides more protection than the
Federal Constitution in the area of education.
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v.
Cuomo 45
(decided June 15, 1995)
The plaintiffs, consisting of the not-for-profit organization
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today [hereinafter
R.E.F.I.T.], sued on behalf of school districts, boards of
education, taxpayers, parents, and students enrolled in the public
schools, challenged the New York State method of public school
financing, claiming that it violated the Education Article of the
New York State Constitution, 46 and the Equal Protection Clauses
of the New York State47 and Federal 48 Constitutions.49 The
41. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
44. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
45. 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995).
46. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Article XI, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated."
Id.
47. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
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